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of the financial transaction involved in this business, we do not
believe this opinion will in any way obstruct the free flow of
commerce. We do not anticipate that we are placing an undue
burden upon the automobile industry in requiring them to
shoulder the responsibility of making sure their products per-
form as they have been represented."3
In furtherance of this stated policy of allowing consumers to seek
redress, the courts would do well to abandon the tests of "close relation-
ship" and "good faith," of "control" and "agency," in a consumer setting
and, in the future, hold all such consumer waivers invalid per se.
STEVEN J. DELANEY
THE POLYGRAPH: SCIENTIFIC v. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE
The defendant was indicted for perjury as a result of allegedly
making false statements under oath before a grand jury. He pleaded not
guilty to the charge and attempted to include as part of his defense an
offer of testimony by polygraph examiners, which he claimed would show
that he believed his allegedly perjurious statements to be truthful. After
hearing evidence on the value and reliability of polygraph tests, the
federal district could held: Testimony concerning the results of polygraph
tests by the court's expert or by the defendant's expert is admissible if,
and only if, the tests conducted by the court-appointed polygraph expert
indicate either that defendant was or was not telling the truth on issues
directly involved in the case. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 784
(E.D. Mich. 1972).
The polygraph referred to is not a "lie detector"; simply stated, it
does not show when the subject is lying, but rather when he is telling the
truth.' More accurately, it records "physiological phenomena that may
be used as the basis for the application of a reliable technique for diagnos-
ing truth or deception."2 The theory behind the instrument is that a
person's autonomic nervous system continues to function normally when
he tells the truth, but that the necessity for concealment--either through
an outright lie or less than full disclosure-will result in observable stress
responses, especially when coupled with a fear of detection.
The machine generally used is actually a combination of several de-
vices which measure and record the body's reaction to stress. These de-
vices include a rubber tube placed around the subject's chest to record
53. 262 So.2d at 456.
1. For a thorough discussion of polygraph theory and technique, see J. REID AND F.
INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION (1966) [hereinafter cited as RE D & INBAU].
2. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
1972] CASES NOTED
changes in respiration, a blood pressure cuff to record heart rate and
blood pressure, and a galvanometer attached to the subject's hand to
record the skin's resistance to electric current. Each of these devices is
attached to a pen which records on a chart the subject's responses to
questions propounded by the examiner. For purposes of comparison and
control, the examiner asks some irrelevant questions and some which he
knows will be answered truthfully, as well as the questions in contro-
versy.
Since the first truth-detection device was attempted in 1895,3 and
prototypes of the present machine developed in the 1920s,4 the value and
reliability of such devices have been disputed.' Lack of general scientific
acceptance was cited as the controlling reason for exclusion in Frye v.
United States,' the first appellate decision to rule on the admissibility
of this type of evidence. In the nearly fifty years since the Frye case was
decided, both federal and state courts have refused to admit polygraph
test results into evidence.7 Most of these decisions were based on the
standard established in Frye, namely, whether the scientific basis for
the evidence sought to be introduced had "gained general acceptance in
3. Cesare Lombroso conducted the first experiments on criminal suspects in 1895,
using a medical device intended to determine the presence or absence of blood pressure-
pulse changes. Id. at 1.
4. William Moulton Marston began developing a systolic blood pressure test in 1915
with successful results; in 1921 John Larson constructed an instrument capable of record-
ing blood pressure, pulse and respiration at the same time. Leonarde Keeler continued to
improve the device and by 1949 his "polygraph" also included a galvanometer. Id. at 2, 3.
5. The Polygraph technique which we have described, when properly used by com-
petent, experienced examiners, possesses a very high degree of accuracy. This we can
conscientiously report from our experience in the examinations, personally, or in the
supervision of the Polygraph examinations, of over 35,000 subjects. It is our view,
therefore, that the results of a competently conducted Polygraph examination should
be accepted as evidence.
Id. at 257. A vehement contrary opinion is expressed in H.R. REP. No. 198, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1965):
There is no 'lie detector,' neither machine nor human. People have been deceived
by a myth that a metal box in the hands of an investigator can detect truth or
falsehood.
6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court stated that
[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities
as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the dis-
covery, development, and experiments thus far made.
Id. at 1014.
7. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 929 (1959); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); People v. Davis,
343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503
(1942); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
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the particular field in which it belongs."' Professor Wigmore, in discuss-
ing scientific experimental tests by psychologists in general, proposes
similar criteria for their admissibility as evidence.,
Although some courts have admitted scientific tests which meet with
less than general acceptance in the particular field,'" other courts seem
to have required a stricter standard approaching infallibility of the test
itself." This more stringent requirement is evidently based upon the
theory that a jury can be expected to attach great weight to this type of
testimony.
Over the years, a few courts have acknowledged that polygraph tests
are sufficiently reliable and have gained such scientific acceptance that
the results would be admissable where the parties have stipulated to
admission.' 2 With the exception of a few county courts,8 however, and
despite a number of determined efforts to secure admission, 4 until Ridling
none had admitted the evidence in the absence of a stipulation.1
5
The court, in Ridling, after acknowledging the great weight of de-
cisions which have continued to deny admission, found that those opinions
were not persuasive insofar as they were predicated upon the unreliability
of the polygraph. 6 After reviewing at length the evidence presented be-
fore it, the court determined that examination techniques are constantly
improving, 7 and held that the record in the case indicated that the theory
of the polygraph was sound.'"
8. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9. 3A J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 990 (Chadbourn rev. 1970):
All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary testimony of a scientist
that the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a reason-
able measure of precision in its indications ....
Id. at 922.
10. In ruling that results of the Nalline narcotics test would be admitted despite the.
fact that the medical profession generally was not acquainted with its use, the court stated:
"It has been generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its
use. In this age of specialization more should not be required." People v. Williams, 164
Cal. App. 2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (App. Dept., Super. Ct. 1958).
11. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); People v. Forte,
279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
12. See, e.g., People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (Dist. Ct. App.
1948).
13. The one reported case admitting polygraph evidence in the absence of a stipulation
has not been followed since. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens
County Ct. 1938). Other unreported county court cases are mentioned in Ferguson, Polyg-
raphy v. Outdated Precedents, 35 Tx. B.J. 531 (1972).
14. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955).
15. A number of cases have held, however, that polygraph testimony would be ad-
mitted in a case where a proper foundation has been laid. United States v. Wainwright,
413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). Also, Judge Chappell in
his concurring opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949), stated his
belief that the polygraph had gained sufficient scientific recognition for admission in a
proper case.
16. In fact, the court stated that polygraph testimony should not be considered ex-
perimental and scientific evidence, but is in reality opinion evidence. 350 F. Supp. at 93.
17. Id. at 94.
18. Id. at 95.
Experts testified that the reliability of the opinion of a qualified polygraph expert
CASES NOTED
Related to the question of the polygraph's reliability is that of the
competence of the examiner who conducts the test, interprets the results
and forms an opinion based upon those results. The necessity for interpre-
tation by a highly skilled examiner seems unquestioned.19 One of the
leading authorities in the field and a proponent of wider use of the poly-
graph has conceded that a polygraph examiner's testimony should not be
admitted as evidence unless he has met certain standards. 20
In the instant case, the court recognized the problem that scientific
techniques seem to have advanced beyond the development of a standard-
ized profession of polygraph examiners, and that "the chance of serious
impropriety on the part of polygraph examiners must be considered."2 1
However, the court devised what it considered to be a practical solution
to this problem by appointing its own expert22 to examine the defendant
to determine whether he is testable2" and if a test will show conclusively
that the defendant either is or is not telling the truth. If the court-
appointed expert is of the opinion that a conclusive result can be reached,
both his opinion and that of the defendant's expert will be admitted,
despite the fact that they may not agree in their interpretation of the
test results. In the event that his tests indicate that the examiner cannot
determine whether the defendant is telling the truth, none of the poly-
graph evidence will be admitted.
Once a court takes the unprecedented step of pronouncing the poly-
graph scientifically sound and reliable, as the Ridling court has done,
thereby overcoming the major hurdle to the polygraph's judicial accep-
tance, the court must still take into account those cases which have based
their rejection of the polygraph on other grounds. Many courts in reject-
ing polygraph testimony have expressed a fear that such testimony would
have a prejudicial effect on the jury and that it might unduly upset the
trial process. Such objections appear to be more cogent reasons for re-
was higher than the opinions of ballistics experts and as high as the opinions of
fingerprint experts.
Id. at 93
19. [T]he importance of having well trained persons as operators must be stressed.
This approach to criminal investigation can prove dangerous in the hands of the
untrained ....
Keeler, A Method for Detecting Deception, 1 Am. J. POL. Sci. 38, 51 (1930).
20. Inbau maintained that the courts should require the examiner to have a college
degree, at least six months of intensive internship training, and at least five years' experi-
ence as a polygraph specialist. REm & INBAU, supra note 1, at 257.
21. 350 F. Supp. at 96. The same fears were expressed in People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.
511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969) and People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72
N.W.2d 269 (1955).
22. As authorized by Rule 706, Federal Rules of Evidence [Proposed], 51 F.R.D. 315,
407. The Federal Rules of Evidence will hereinafter be cited as Rules. The Rules were to
become effective July 1, 1973, but have since been amended and are not as yet in effect.
23. From the evidence presented before it, the court concluded that no more than 6%
of well conducted tests would be inconclusive. 350 F. Supp. at 92. However, a number of
other courts have repeatedly questioned the effects of an individual's possible mental or
physiological abnormalities on the reliability of the test results. See, e.g., Henderson v. State,
94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
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jecting polygraph testimony than blindly following outdated precedent24
or refusing to re-examine the polygraph's reliability. 5 Moreover, it has
been suggested that such considerations should entirely replace the test
of general scientific acceptance as a basis for passing upon the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence.2"
Specific objections raised in this area include the contentions that
the evaluation of polygraph testimony is too subtle a task for the jury,
and that the jury would tend to give too much weight to polygraph evi-
dence.2" In Ridling, the court met these objections by emphasizing the
increased educational background, awareness and general sophistication
of today's jurors, concluding that jurors
would welcome all evidence having a bearing on the problem
they are deciding and the give and take of deliberation would
expose weaknesses in any witness or evidence. A modern jury,
that must deliberate, and must agree, is the ideal body to evalu-
ate opinions of this kind. The search for truth would be en-
hanced . ... .
The court also discussed the necessity of balancing the probative
value of the evidence against the possibility of unfair prejudice or of
misleading the jury,3" and it concluded that where the defendant is ac-
cused of perjury, an offer of polygraph testimony goes to the very heart
of the case. In reaching its conclusion, the court compared the use of
radar in speeding cases, and blood tests and "breathalizers" in intoxica-
tion cases with the polygraph."1
Also raised among the objections to the polygraph's admissibility is
the possibility of injecting collateral issues in to the trial, perhaps result-
ing in a trial of the polygraph itself, and the impossibility of cross-
examining the machine.3 2 In the instant case, the court conceded that col-
lateral issues would be raised if use of the polygraph were permitted on
all witnesses, and stated that therefore its use would not be sanctioned
to that extent. However, use of the polygraph as to the defendant in this
24. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 929 (1959).
25. People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
26. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF TuE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972).
27. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb.
368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
28. People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955).
29. 350 F. Supp. at 98.
30. Rule 403(a), Rules, supra note 22, at 345.
31. 350 F. Supp. at 95. Another approach is suggested by the Advisory Committee in
its report on the 1971 draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consider-
ation should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a
limiting instruction. . . . The availability of other means of proof may also be an
appropriate factor.
Rules, supra note 22, at 346.
32. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); State v. Bohner,
210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
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case would involve direct rather than collateral issues since the very
nature of a perjury charge places the defendant's character trait of truth-
fulness in issue. Polygraph testimony could therefore be introduced by
either side, regardless of whether the defendant took the stand or put
his character in issue.8a
Although the court in Ridling did not specifically consider the objec-
tion found in a number of cases that the polygraph machine itself could
not be cross-examined, 4 this appears to be a rather unsubstantial objec-
tion. If the examiner himself is available for cross-examination, and con-
sidering the court's safeguard of requiring its own expert to examine the
defendant, the fact that the inanimate machine cannot itself be questioned
should be of no consequence. 8
Having dealt with the great weight of precedent excluding polygraph
evidence on the bases examined above, the court then addressed itself to
possible self-incrimination and hearsay issues raised by its decision to
admit the proffered evidence. The self-incrimination question is largely
academic since voluntary consent and active cooperation of the person
being tested are essential to- a successful test, and such consent would
effectively waive the privilege.8" Furthermore, Ridling specifically held
that if the defendant should decline to participate in the test, none of the
evidence would be admitted. Since coercion is not involved, therefore,
should the court's witness disagree with the defendant's examiner, or the
prosecution offer independent witnesses, the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination will not have been violated.
In discussing the hearsay aspect of its decision, the court pointed out
that the examiner's questions and the subject's answers are not received
in evidence for their truth; rather, they are
evidence of the stimulus for the response of the autonomic ner-
vous system of the subject that is being interpreted by the expert
.... The testimony to be admitted is the opinion 6f the expert
that the subject is or is not telling the truth. 7
The court approached the hearsay issue from two angles. First, it reasoned
that an expert may base his opinion on matters which are "reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field, ' 38 in this case the poly-
33. It does not stretch the law at all to hold that the opinion of a polygraph exam-
iner that the defendant is telling the truth on these points is evidence of a trait of
character to establish the fact that he did not do the act or did not lie before the
Grand Jury.
350 F. Supp. at 98. The court also indicated that use of the polygraph would be more
limited in a case where the defendant's truthfulness was less directly involved, and would
be permitted only if the defendant took the stand or put his character in issue.
34. See note 32, supra.
35. For example, testimony based on X-rays and other medical instruments is ad-
missible.
36. State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
37. 350 F. Supp. at 99.
38. Rule 703, Rules, supra note 22, at 404.
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graph examination itself, including the questions and answers. Then, from
a different perspective, the court went on to state that although the
statements made by the subject of the examination and reported to the
jury may appear to be hearsay, the evidence should be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule because of its high degree of trustworthi-
ness.
8 9
Ridling's break with nearly fifty years of precedent should have a
salutary effect on the criminal trial process. The practice of dropping a
prosecution if the accused successfully passes a polygraph test4" should
meet with greater approval among law enforcement agencies, since the
reliability of the polygraph has received some judicial approval. With
greater pre-trial use of the polygraph many innocent persons may never
be subjected to the ordeal of a criminal trial nor will overcrowded court
dockets be further strained unnecessarily.4 It is to be hoped that other
courts will follow Ridling's lead and decide on a case-by-case basis
whether a sufficient foundation has been laid for introducing polygraph
evidence, rather than continuing to follow outdated precedent. The court,
in its well-reasoned opinion, appears to have carefully considered all
ramifications of its decision and has provided safeguards against possible
abuse of this valuable tool for assisting the fact-finding tribunal. Hope-
fully, other courts will be equally cautious.
NANCY M. LITTLE
39. Rule 803(24), Rules, supra note 22, at 422. The Advisory Committee explains that
while the rule does not contemplate an "unfettered exercise of judicial discretion," it pro-
vides for new situations which demonstrate a sufficient degree of trustworthiness. Id. at
437.
40. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 228 So.2d 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969); State v. Davis, 188
So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
41. Interestingly, in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which estab-
lished the long-standing precedent for exclusion, the excluded test results indicating the
convicted defendant's innocence were corroborated when another party subsequently con-
fessed to the murder. Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22
TENN. L. REV. 711, 715 (1953).
